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The Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage: A
Response to Securities Regulation in
Virtual Space
Wendy Gerwick Couture *
Abstract
In Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, Eric. C. Chaffee
explores the potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual
transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although
many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment contracts”
under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., they should be excluded under
the context clause because, among other reasons, application of the
securities laws would stifle creativity within this innovative space.
This Response proposes a reframing of the Howey test as a
response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, argues that the context
clause should only exclude transactions that do not pose such a
risk, contends that transactions in virtual space do pose a risk of
regulatory arbitrage, and thus concludes that these transactions
should not be excluded from the securities laws. In recognition of
Professor Chaffee’s compelling argument that securities regulation
would hinder creativity within this burgeoning area, this
Response argues for a new exemption from registration that would
further the policy goals of the securities laws while not stifling
innovation in virtual space.

*
Wendy Gerwick Couture is a Professor of Law at the University of
Idaho, where she teaches securities regulation, business associations, and white
collar crime.
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I am delighted to have this opportunity to respond briefly to
Eric C. Chaffee’s thought-provoking article, Securities Regulation
in Virtual Space. 1 Professor Chaffee’s article explores the
potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual
transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although
many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment
contracts” under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 2 they should be
excluded under the context clause 3 because, among other reasons,
application of the securities laws would stifle creativity within
this innovative space.
My response proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss four
unique contributions that Professor Chaffee’s article makes to the
extant literature. 4 In Part II, I propose a reframing of the Howey
test and the context clause as a response to the risk of regulatory
arbitrage. 5 I argue that Howey’s broad definition of “investment
1. Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1387 (2017).
2. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (prefacing the definitions with the clause “unless the
context otherwise requires”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (same).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part II.
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contract” operates to prevent parties from structuring
transactions to evade the securities laws and that the context
clause operates as a release valve to the extent the transaction at
issue does not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. In Part III, I
apply this new perspective on the intersection of the Howey test
and the context clause to virtual transactions based on virtual
activity. 6 I contend that, because these transactions pose a risk of
regulatory arbitrage, they should not be excluded by the context
clause. Finally, in response to Professor Chaffee’s compelling
argument that securities regulation would hinder creativity
within this burgeoning area, I argue that a better response is to
enact a new exemption from registration that would further the
policy goals of the securities laws while not stifling innovation in
virtual space. 7
I.

Unique Contributions of Securities Regulation in
Virtual Space

Professor Chaffee’s article makes several unique
contributions. First, he creates a new taxonomy for securities
transactions: (1) real-world transactions based on real-world
activity; (2) real-world transactions based on virtual activity; (3)
virtual transactions based on real-world activity; and (4) virtual
transactions based on virtual activity. 8 As explained by Professor
Chaffee, the potential applicability of securities regulation differs
in each context, and I anticipate that future scholars and courts
will find this taxonomy useful when analyzing novel transactions.
Second, Professor Chaffee provides the first in-depth
discussion of transactions within the fourth category of his
taxonomy: virtual transactions based on virtual activity. 9 After
providing a primer on video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality,
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra Part III.
See id.
Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1419.
Id. at 1422.
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and augmented reality, he gives examples of transactions that
already fall within this category, such as securities exchanges
that operate in the online virtual world of Second Life, and
recognizes the potential future growth of this type of virtual
transaction. 10
Third, Professor Chaffee applies the Howey test 11 for
“investment contracts,” 12 which are a subset of the securities
regulated by the federal securities laws, to virtual transactions
based on virtual activity, concluding that many of these
transactions likely qualify as investment contracts. 13 He also
recognizes that these transactions could be structured to fall
outside the scope of the Howey test, such as by eliminating the
potential for real world currency to be exchanged for virtual
currency, but argues that these workarounds the Howey test
would limit innovation. 14
Finally, applying an expansive interpretation of the prefatory
clause “unless the context otherwise requires,” 15 Professor
Chaffee argues that virtual transactions based on virtual activity
should be excluded from the definition of “security,” despite their
likely satisfaction of the Howey test. 16 Professor Chaffee contends
that the policy reasons for excluding these transactions from the
scope of securities regulation outweigh the policy reasons for
including them. 17 Professor Chaffee argues that it would exceed
Congressional intent to apply the securities laws to transactions
without a substantial link to the real world; 18 that extending the
reach of the federal securities laws to these transactions, where
“doubt exists as to whether Congress has exercised its power” to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1394–98 & 1422–25
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1423–27.
Id. at 1427.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a).
Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1433–35.
Id. at 1435–56.
Id. at 1435–39.
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regulate, 19 would implicate federalism and separation of power
concerns; 20 and that applying securities regulation to these
transactions would hinder creativity within this burgeoning
space. 21
My response to Professor Chaffee’s article focuses on the last
of these contributions. In short, I propose a reframing of the
Howey test and the context clause as a response to the risk of
regulatory arbitrage. Drawing therefrom, I argue that, rather
than excluding virtual transactions based on virtual activity from
securities regulation altogether, these transactions should be
subject to a new exemption from registration requirements but
not from securities fraud prohibitions.
II.

Reframing the Howey Test and the Context Clause as a
Response to the Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage

I propose a new way of looking at the interaction of the
Howey test for “investment contracts” and the prefatory context
clause: as a response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage.
A.

Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage in the Context of Securities

Regulatory arbitrage “exploits the gap between the economic
substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment,
taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability
to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions
with sufficient precision.” 22 As explained by Victor Fleischer,
when parties engage in regulatory arbitrage, they may select
structures that increase transaction costs but decrease regulatory
costs, thus “leading to results that are inefficient in the short run
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1440.
Id. at 1439–44.
Id. at 1444–48.
Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
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and indeterminate in the long run.” 23 Moreover, to the extent that
parties engaging in regulatory arbitrage are able to avoid
regulation that seeks to further certain policy goals, those policy
goals are undercut.
Broadly speaking, securities regulation furthers two general
policy goals when applied to transactions: ensuring that investors
have sufficient information when making investment decisions
and deterring fraud. 24 The requirement that securities offerings
either be registered or exempt from registration 25 furthers the
former purpose, and the securities fraud prohibitions, 26 including
private rights of action, further the latter.
Not surprisingly, compliance with the securities laws is
costly, which motivates parties to structure transactions in order
to avoid application of the securities laws. As a recent example,
initial coin offerings, to the extent that they are structured in an
attempt to avoid application of the securities laws, demonstrate
the incentive for regulatory arbitrage in the context of
securities. 27
23. Id. at 275.
24. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and
the Definition of “Security”: The “Context” Claus, “Investment Contract” Analysis,
and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 512 (1987) (“The Acts have at
least a dual function: to provide an adequate and accurate informational flow to
the investing public and to ensure a measure of integrity and protection against
abuse in the marketplace.”).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
27. See SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and
Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-1211#_ftnref5 (“Following the issuance of the 21(a) Report, certain market
professionals have attempted to highlight utility characteristics of their
proposed initial coin offerings in an effort to claim that their proposed tokens or
coins are not securities.”); see also Securities and Exchange Commission, Report
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: The DAO, S.E.C. Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter “The
21(a) Report”] (analyzing whether the sale of particular tokens by a
decentralized autonomous organization are within the scope of the securities
laws).
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The Howey Test as a Broad Rule to Prevent Regulatory
Arbitrage

One way of preventing regulatory arbitrage is to adopt broad
rules that are “not targeted at a specific deal structure or type of
investment,” thus limiting the opportunity to structure a
transaction in a way to avoid regulatory coverage. 28 As an
example of such a broad rule, Professor Fleischer cites Section
469 of the Tax Code, 29 which “targets all passive-activity losses,
however generated” and thus decreases the ability to exploit tax
shelters. 30
The securities laws apply only to transactions in “securities,”
which are defined with a laundry list that includes specific types
of securities like “notes” and “stock.” 31 If the list were limited to
these specific types, there would be a significant opportunity to
structure transactions to avoid the securities laws. The definition
of “security” also includes a catch-all, however—the
aforementioned “investment contract.” 32 As defined by the
Supreme Court in Howey, an investment contract is “a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party.” 33 These elements
together represent the types of interests, no matter how
structured, that merit regulation under the securities laws. 34 The
premise of this definition of “investment contract” is that the
policy goals of ensuring disclosure and preventing fraud are
implicated when people make investments (contribute money
with the goal of profiting) in a pooled transaction in which the
28. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 255.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 469.
30. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 255.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99.
34. See id. at 298 (“Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was
placed upon economic reality.”).
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investors are largely passive (and thus unable to protect
themselves to the same degree as if they were active participants
in the venture). 35
In other words, the broad definition of “investment contract”
prevents regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Howey emphasized this rationale for defining investment
contracts broadly: “It embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits.” 36 In addition, this
rationale is consistent with Congress’s intent to apply the
securities laws to “the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.” 37
For this reason, although I agree with Professor Chaffee that, in
1933 and 1934, Congress did not anticipate that the securities
laws would to apply to transactions without a substantial link to
the real world, 38 I disagree that Congress did not intend for the
securities laws to be responsive to changing technology, including
the potential application to virtual transactions based on virtual
activity. Likewise, because Congress intended the category of
“investment contracts” to operate as a catch-all, I disagree with
35. See Jonathan M. Sobel, A Rose May Not Always Be A Rose: Some
General Partnership Interests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal
Securities Acts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1994) (“The Howey test
attempts to distinguish passive investors from those able to protect their own
investments. These latter investors are generally thought not to need the
protection of the securities acts.”).
36. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; accord S.E.C. v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
However, the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that
they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing
which established their character in commerce as “investment
contracts, ” or as ‘any interest or instrument commonly known as a
“security.”
37. Howey, 328 U.S. at 229 (quoting H. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess.,
p.11).
38. See Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1435-39.
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Professor Chaffee that it implicates federalism or separation of
powers concerns for it to do just that.
And the broad definition of “investment contract” has been
effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage. As a recent example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission interpreted particular
tokens sold by a decentralized autonomous organization to be
investment contracts and thus subject to the securities laws. 39 As
explained by S.E.C. Chair Jay Clayton in a recent public
statement, “replacing a traditional corporate interest recorded in
a central ledger with an enterprise interest recorded through a
blockchain entry on a distributed ledger may change the form of
the transaction, but it does not change the substance.” 40
C. The Context Clause as a Release Valve When There Is Not an
Arbitrage Risk
And yet, by using a broad rule to prevent regulatory
arbitrage, there is also a risk that the rule will bring transactions
within the scope of regulation even if they do not pose an
arbitrage risk. Therefore, it is helpful to include a release valve
that excludes those transactions that do not pose such a risk, lest
those transactions be burdened unnecessarily. I argue that the
context clause interacts with the definition of “investment
contract” in this way. In other words, rather than Professor
Chaffee’s interpretation of the context clause as an invitation to
analyze whether “the surrounding conditions of the thing that
might be a security dictate that it not be covered by the federal
securities law,” 41 I contend that the context clause should apply
only to those situations in which the definition of investment
contract reaches too broadly and sweeps in transactions that do
not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage.
39. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
S.E.C. Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017).
40. Supra note 27.
41. Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1435.
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As accurately explained by Professor Chaffee, the Supreme
Court has not provided explicit guidance about the scope of the
context clause. 42 While aspects of the Court’s seminal context
clause opinion, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 43 have been aptly
criticized as “the product of hopelessly circular logic” 44 and as
“bristl[ing] with analytical deficiencies,” 45 I contend that the
Court’s application of the context clause in Weaver is consistent
with its role as a release valve when there is not a risk of
regulatory arbitrage.
In Weaver, the Court explicitly applied the context clause to
exclude a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated
bank from the scope of the securities laws 46 and implicitly applied
it to exclude a unique profit-sharing agreement between two
families. 47 Both scenarios are consistent with my conception of
using the context clause to exclude transactions that do not pose
a risk of regulatory arbitrage.
First, the certificate of deposit did not pose a risk of
regulatory arbitrage because it was already “subject to the
comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking
industry,” 48 which is comparably robust to the regulations
governing securities. The reporting, inspection, and advertising
rules that apply to federally regulated banks arguably serve as a
substitute for the registration and reporting rules that apply to
securities, 49 and FDIC insurance arguably serves as a substitute
42. See id. at 1434 (“[O]ne starts with a relatively blank slate in
determining whether the ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ language
excludes securities entirely within virtual space from coverage by federal
securities law.”).
43. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
44. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 521.
45. Gary P. Bunch, Marine Bank v. Weaver: What is a Security?, 34
MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1042 (1983).
46. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559.
47. Id. at 560; see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 507
(recognizing the “Court’s implicit application of the ‘context’ clause to preclude
the Weaver profit-sharing agreement”).
48. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558.
49. Id.; Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 514.
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for the securities acts’ antifraud rules. 50 Therefore, it is unlikely
that transactions would be restructured to take advantage of
banking regulation and avoid securities regulation.
This is admittedly a re-framing of the Court’s reasoning in
Weaver, which focused on the specific risk of investor harm 51
rather than the general risk of regulatory arbitrage. But this
interpretation of Weaver is responsive to the legitimate critique
that “FDIC protection is not analogous to the availability of a
private right of action under the securities laws: the former
insures against loss, but the latter serves as both a deterrent and
a remedy in proper circumstances.” 52 If Weaver is interpreted as
an assessment of the risk of regulatory arbitrage, the
comparability of the specific antifraud protections afforded
investors under the two regulatory schemes is less important
than an assessment of the general risk of incentivizing parties to
restructure transactions to avoid the securities laws.
Second, the profit-sharing agreement between two families in
Weaver did not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage because of its
unique nature, which is unlikely to be duplicated by other parties
in an effort to evade the securities laws. The agreement at issue
was between the Piccirillo family and the Weaver family. The
Weavers agreed to guarantee a bank loan to a slaughterhouse
and retail meat business owned by the Piccirillos. 53 In return, the
Piccirillos granted the Weavers 50% of the business’s net profits,
$100 per month, usage of the business’s barn and pasture, and
the right to veto future borrowing by the business. 54 Because this
was a “unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties,” 55
it did not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage; indeed, it is unlikely
50. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558; Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 514.
51. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559 (“It is unnecessary to subject issuers of
bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are
abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.”).
52. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 515.
53. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 553.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 560.
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that parties would introduce barn-sharing into their transactions
in order to evade the securities laws.
While this is admittedly a re-focusing of the Court’s
reasoning in Weaver, which centered on whether the Piccirollos
treated the agreement as a security (such as by distributing a
prospectus) 56 rather than on whether it posed the risk of
regulatory arbitrage. But this interpretation of Weaver is
responsive to the legitimate critique that the Court’s reasoning is
“hopelessly circular”: “[I]f a prospectus is required only upon first
determining that a security is involved, how can ‘security’ be
defined in terms of whether a prospectus is distributed?” 57 If
Weaver is interpreted as an assessment of the risk of regulatory
arbitrage, the parties’ anticipation of the potential applicability of
the securities laws is relevant.
Therefore, I argue that the context clause should be
interpreted as providing a release valve for transactions that do
not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. Weaver exemplifies two
situations in which it is unlikely that parties would adopt certain
structures in an effort to evade the securities laws: (1) where
another comprehensive regulatory scheme would apply to the
transaction even if the securities laws do not; and (2) where the
transaction is of such a unique nature that it is unlikely to be
duplicated or scaled.
III.

The Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage in Virtual Space

Drawing from this conception—that the definition of
“investment contract” and the context clause work together to
reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage—the question presented
by virtual transactions based on virtual reality is whether they
pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. I agree with Professor Chaffee
that these transactions likely fall within the broad definition of
56. See id. (“[T]he Piccirillos distributed no prospectus to the Weavers or to
other potential investors, and the unique agreement they negotiated was not
designed to be traded publicly.”).
57. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 521.
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“investment contract.” But, I contend that they should be
excluded by the context clause only if they do not pose a risk of
regulatory arbitrage.
The risk of regulatory arbitrage is reduced if the transactions
are subject to another comprehensive body of law (like federal
banking regulations) that, although not mimicking the securities
laws, responds to the central securities laws concerns of ensuring
disclosure and prohibiting fraud. Although Professor Chaffee
notes that criminal wire fraud provisions would likely apply to
virtual transactions based on virtual activity, 58 which is
responsive to some degree to the antifraud aspect of the securities
laws, no other body of law imposes disclosure requirements akin
to those imposed by the securities laws. Therefore, the presence
of another body of comprehensive regulation does not limit the
risk of regulatory arbitrage for these virtual transactions.
The risk of regulatory arbitrage is also reduced if the
transactions are unlikely to be viable alternatives to traditional
securities (such as a profit-sharing agreement between families
that includes access to a barn and pasture). If virtual
transactions based on virtual activity were limited to a relatively
circumscribed world, perhaps they could be analogized to the
profit-sharing agreement in Weaver. But, as Professor Chaffee
notes, “[v]irtual space existing within video games, virtual
worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality has become a
regular part of most peoples’ lives.” 59 Therefore, I believe that
excluding these virtual transactions from the scope of the
securities laws poses the risk of funneling transactions to this
platform and undercutting the goals of the securities laws.
Therefore, I argue that virtual transactions based on virtual
reality, to the extent they fall within the definition of “investment
contracts,” should be treated as securities. In response to
Professor Chaffee’s legitimate concern about hindering creativity
in this burgeoning area, I believe that the better response is to
enact a new exemption from registration that is responsive to the
58.
59.

Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1452.
Id. at 1455.
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unique considerations that arise in virtual space. Like the federal
crowdfunding exemption, 60 which seeks to adapt the securities
laws to a “relatively new and evolving method of using the
Internet to raise capital to support a wide range of ideas and
ventures,” 61 this new exemption could seek to further the policy
goals of the securities laws while not stifling innovation in virtual
space. This proposed solution would depend on Congress’s
possessing the political will to act. Yet, if courts and regulators
consistently apply the securities laws to those virtual
transactions that qualify as investment contracts, 62 and if that
application unduly inhibits creativity, Congress may be
motivated to respond, as it did in the context of crowdfunding.
In conclusion, I applaud Professor Chaffee for his article’s
unique contributions in an emerging area, and I welcome an
ongoing scholarly discussion about the role of the context clause
as applied to “investment contracts” and about the application of
that clause in innovative spaces, including virtual transactions
based on virtual activity.

60. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 et seq.; Securities and Exchange Commission,
Crowdfunding, S.E.C. Release No. 9974, 2015 WL 7273273, at *3 (Oct. 30, 2015)
Regulation Crowdfunding, among other things, permits
individuals to invest in securities-based crowdfunding
transactions subject to certain thresholds, limits the amount of
money an issuer can raise under the crowdfunding exemption,
requires issuers to disclose certain information about their
offers, and creates a regulatory framework for the
intermediaries that facilitate the crowdfunding transactions.
61. Securities and Exchange Commission, Crowdfunding, S.E.C. Release
No. 9974, 2015 WL 7273273, at *4 (Oct. 30, 2015).
62. See S.E.C. v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44 & 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing
dismissal of the SEC’s complaint because, as alleged, the “virtual shares in an
enterprise existing only in cyberspace” satisfied the Howey test).

